We analyze the influence of IT governance on IT 
Introduction
Over the last two decades, IT investment has accounted for an increasing share of capital investments in US firms. Real investment in information technology increased from less than 30 percent of nonresidential equipment and software investment in 1985 to close to 60 percent in 2004 (BEA 2007) . The return on IT investment, however, varies significantly across firms. Standish Group reports that 15 percent of all IT investments are abandoned, and another 50 percent are delayed or delivered without meeting user expectations (Schwartz 2004) .
The high variations in IT investment performance have been attributed to a variety of organizational factors . These factors 1 range from organizational structure (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1997; Brynjolfsson et al. 2002; Cron and Sobol 1983) , to human capital practices (Francalanci and Galal 1998; Bresnahan, Bryjolfsson and Hitt 2000) , to operational and managerial capabilities (Banker, et. al. 2006 ; Kearns and Sabherwal 2006; Tanriverdi 2005; Weill 1992) , to outsourcing strategy and inter-firm integration (Bardhan et. al. 2007; Rai et. al. 2006) , to the alignment between IT and organizational capabilities (Zhu and Kraemer. 2002; Aral and Weill 2007; Bardhan et al. 2007) , and to the usage of IT assets and systems Aral et. al. 2006; Dos Santos 1993; Mukhopadhyay et. al. 1997) . It is suggested that a firm's failure to recognize these organizational factors and implement necessary changes contributes to diminished returns from its IT investments.
However, organizational factors alone cannot explain variations in IT investment performance. A well-run business is expected to foresee the need to implement complementary organizational changes and to make the necessary organizational investments along with IT investments. We posit that an important factor that leads firms to potentially overlook organizational factors when making IT investments lies in the investment decision process and, in particular, in a firm's IT governance mode.
IT governance refers to the allocation of IT decision rights within a firm (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) . The complementarity between IT investments and organizational factors indicates that IT decisions should be made at the right organizational level to ensure that both IT and organizational changes are considered in the IT investment decisions. IT governance is especially important for large and multiunit firms (Watson and Brancheau 1991; Brown and Magill 1994; Weill and Ross 2004) . Since the headquarters of large firms are often removed from the daily operations of business units, the information asymmetry forces headquarters to make a trade-off between centralizing decision rights to leverage economies of scale and synergies across multiple business units, and decentralizing decision rights to empower individual business units. Research shows that there is no single IT governance mode that fits all firms (Brown and Magill 1994; Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) . A more centralized governance mode is preferred by firms with significant cost or revenue synergies across business units, while a more decentralized governance mode is preferred by firms that value local agility (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; Csaszar and Clemons 2006; Xue et al. 2007 ).
Despite substantial research on IT governance and on IT investment performance, there have been relatively few studies on how IT governance influences IT investment performance. The objective of this study is to assess the influence of IT governance on IT investment performance by using sample data from Fortune 1000 companies. A key challenge in the analysis is the varying nature of IT governance across firms and across business units within a firm. We address this challenge by first developing a measure of IT governance misalignment that assesses the degree to which a firm or a business unit's adopted IT governance mode deviates from the ideal governance mode predicted using a multiple contingency factor model of IT governance. We then analyze how the IT governance misalignment influences IT investment performance. We find that IT governance misalignment has a significant moderating effect on the performance contribution of a firm's IT investments. Firms with high IT governance misalignment derive no value from their IT investments; while businesses with low IT governance misalignment obtain two to three times the value from their IT investments compared to firms with average IT governance misalignment.
The analysis also validates the use of the multiple contingency factor model in assessing firms' IT governance decisions. Prior research has highlighted the importance of considering multiple contingency factors in IT governance (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) . However, these studies are mainly based on case studies or smallsample analysis, and their generalizability has not been assessed. By conducting a large-sample study and by demonstrating that firms that deviate from the model's prediction have significantly lower IT investment performance, we validate the generalizability of the multiple contingency factor model to a broad spectrum of firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical foundation of the study. After that, we present the multiple contingency factor model of IT governance and develop a measure of IT governance misalignment. We then assess the influence of IT governance misalignment on firms' IT investment performance. Finally, we conclude with implications and limitations.
Theoretical Foundation and Hypotheses
Information technology is a "general purpose technology" (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995) . The value of such technology depends on how firms utilize it to enhance their management and operations. IT assets sitting on the shelf of warehouses generate no value for a firm, while IT assets embedded in a firm's daily operations are often indispensible. As a general purpose technology, IT's usage goes beyond simple automation. Studies indicate that a significant portion of the business value generated by information technology comes from complementarities between information technology and organizational practices (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Basu and Jarnagin 2008) .
A variety of organizational practices have been considered in the literature. Bresnahan et al. (2000) find that information technology facilitates a firm's delegation of more authority to individuals and business units at lower organizational levels. Firms adopting a decentralized organizational structure obtain higher productivity and more value from their IT investments. Brynjolfsson et al. (2000) show that the same result holds when firm value is measured based on stock market valuation. Devaraj and Kohli (2003) find that the value of IT investments depends on actual usage. This study highlights the importance of having organizational practices in place to motivate productive usage of IT assets. Tanriverdi (2006) finds that exploring IT synergies across business units plays an important role in bringing out the value of IT investments. This finding suggests that businesses need to make necessary organizational changes to leverage cross-unit IT synergies. Melville et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive overview of the literature and find that the value of IT investments is dependent on a number of internal and external factors, ranging from complementary organizational resources to macro market environments.
The presence of organizational and environmental factors highlights the fact that IT investment decisions are not just local decisions. IT investment decisions need to be made at the appropriate organizational level to ensure that multiple organizational and environmental factors are taken into consideration. A growing literature on IT governance addresses this question and studies the optimal allocation of IT decision rights (e.g., Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; Xue et al. 2007 ). These studies reveal that there is no single IT governance mode that fits all businesses. The optimal IT governance mode is determined by a rich set of multiple contingency factors.
Despite the large body of research in IT governance, a key question remains unanswered: how effective is IT governance in deriving business value from IT investments? The few studies on this issue have obtained mixed results. Weill and Ross (2004) conduct a survey of IT governance in 250 large enterprises and find that "firms with superior IT governance have at least 20% higher profit than firms with poor IT governance." The study indicates that IT governance is strongly correlated with overall firm performance. Tanriverdi (2006) studies firms' ability to leverage IT synergies across business units and the moderating effect of IT governance on this ability. The study hypothesizes that "performance effects of IT synergies will be highest in firms using a centralized IT governance mode…" He finds no evidence to support the hypothesis.
These studies show that researchers have different views on how IT governance influences firm performance. Weill and Ross (2004) focus on the direct effect of IT governance on firm performance, while Tanriverdi (2006) examines how IT governance moderates the influence of IT relatedness on firm performance. In this study, we note that the ultimate goal of IT governance is to bring out the business value of IT investment. When IT investment is small, IT governance will have little impact on firm performance. The influence of IT governance rises with the scale of a firm's IT investment. We, therefore, propose the following hypothesis:
H1: IT governance moderates the relationship between IT investment and firm performance.
Measuring IT Governance Alignments
A key challenge in testing the implications of IT governance is to first determine whether a firm has adopted an appropriate IT governance mode. Prior studies find that the IT governance choice is influenced by multiple contingency factors and that the ideal IT governance mode varies across firms and across business units within a firm. Therefore, we first develop an empirical IT governance model to identify a business unit's ideal IT governance mode.
The objective of the IT governance model is to provide a valid and quantitative measure for IT governance alignment and to later assess its influence on firms' IT investment performance. To ensure the validity of the measure, it is imperative for the IT governance model to be built on a well-established body of knowledge on IT governance. In this regard, Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) provide an excellent synthesis of the multiple contingency factors of IT governance. We leverage these contingency factors to develop the IT governance model.
Governance issues arise whenever the interests of headquarters and business units are not in full alignment (Eisenhardt 1989; Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Hart 1995) . Agency theory identifies two key countervailing forces that influence the optimal allocation of decision rights: incentive misalignment and information asymmetry. Incentive misalignment encourages centralization of decision rights so that headquarters can maximize profits for the entire firm. Information asymmetry encourages decentralization of decision rights to business units, as they are closer to the market and have better and timelier information for decision making.
Incentive Misalignment
The main cause for incentive misalignment in a multiunit firm is the presence of cost or revenue synergies across business units. When decisions are made at the business unit level, little regard is given to the synergies that could benefit other units. Centralizing decision making allows a firm to take full consideration of potential synergies and maximize the overall performance. Synergies are especially important for IT investments such as IT infrastructure, management practices, and IT applications that can be shared across business units (Tanriverdi 2006) . Prior studies of IT governance find three categories of contingency factors that affect synergies across business units.
First, IT investment exhibits economies of scale. The fixed cost of IT infrastructure is significant, while the variable cost is often minimal. Sharing IT infrastructure across business units can dramatically cut down duplications and save costs on IT investments. The benefits of economies of scale are especially valuable to smaller business units that are below the minimum efficient scale. Larger business units, on the other hand, benefit less from sharing IT infrastructure, as they are often large enough to obtain economies of scale within their own operations. Moreover, when an IT infrastructure grows in scale, coordination costs increase significantly, limiting the potential of cost synergy. Therefore, size is a key contingency factor in a business unit's IT governance choice (Ein-Dor and Segev 1982, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) .
Second, IT investment exhibits economies of scope. Economies of scope refer to the cost or revenue synergies within a multiunit firm that operates across related industries. Knowledge and investments in one industry may benefit business operations in other related industries and, thus, reduce costs and increase revenues. Economies of scope in multiunit firms are related to a firm's diversification strategy, including diversification breadth and diversification mode (Brown and Magill 1994, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) . Diversification breadth refers to the market relatedness of a multiunit firm. Synergies are stronger between related industries and markets, since they share common bases of customers, production, and knowledge. On the other hand, firms that diversify further away from their core business are less likely to share common resources and thus obtain fewer synergies from centralized IT governance. A business unit that is closely related to a firm's core industry can therefore benefit more from synergies with other related business units, and is more likely to have centralized IT governance as the headquarters make IT investment decisions for all related business units. A business unit that is unrelated to a firm's core industry has few synergies with other business units, and therefore is more likely to have decentralized IT governance and make its own IT investment decisions. Synergies among business units are influenced not only by diversification breadth but also from a firm's diversification mode. Firms relying on internal growth are more familiar with the entry industry and are better able to exploit synergies among business units than firms growing through acquisitions.
Third, the general corporate governance affects a firm's capability to leverage IT synergies across business units. A centralized corporate governance mode makes it easier for a business to exploit cross-unit synergies than a decentralized corporate governance mode (Applegate et al. 1996; Brown and Magill 1994) . As a result, a firm with centralized corporate governance is more likely to adopt centralized IT governance as well.
In summary, the motivation to leverage synergies across business units drives firms to adopt a centralized IT governance mode. However, cross-unit synergies are not the only driving force that influences IT governance. An equally important driving force is information asymmetry.
Information Asymmetry
In large firms, headquarters are often removed from business unit operations. The cost and time delay in receiving information about business unit operations provides a disincentive for headquarters to centralize decision rights. The magnitude of information asymmetry varies with the size of the business unit. Large scale operations not only produce more information, but also produce more fragmented information. Business unit size, therefore, influences the allocation of IT decision rights through both incentive misalignment and information asymmetry. Similarly, diversification breadth also influences the information asymmetry between headquarters and business units. Firms diversified into related industries are more familiar with the industry environment of each business unit and suffer less information asymmetry compared to those diversified into unrelated industries. Diversification breadth, therefore, also influences both incentive misalignment and information asymmetry in IT governance decisions.
Information asymmetry is also influenced by the depth of local IT knowledge at the business unit level. Substantial local IT knowledge empowers a business unit to leverage its local information that increases the information advantages enjoyed by the business unit (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999).
The above factors outline an empirical model that identifies the ideal IT governance mode for a business unit, given various contingency factors. We develop an empirical model based on the above factors using sample data from Fortune 1000 firms. By comparing the predicted IT governance mode with the IT governance mode adopted by a business unit, we obtain a measure of the IT governance misalignment at the business unit level. We aggregate the IT governance misalignment of all business units of a firm to identify the overall IT governance misalignment of the firm and then study its relationship with IT investment performance.
Data
We combine data from four main sources in this study. First, we obtained data on IT resources and IT governance from the CI Technology Database. This database contains detailed information about IT infrastructure in over 500,000 business establishments in the United States and Canada. Harte-Hanks maintains this database through over 7,000 phone-based interviews every month. The information in the database covers 10 key IT areas, including personal computing, systems and servers, networking, software, storage, and managed services. Various versions of this database has been used in prior research in the IS literature (e.g., Zhu and Kraemer 2002; Forman 2005; Chen and Forman 2006; Xue et al. 2008 ).
Harte-Hanks identifies three levels of business establishments: branches, divisional headquarters, and firm headquarters. Divisional headquarters represent business units, while firm headquarters identify firms. For this research, we use business unit level data for measuring IT governance misalignment and firm level data for assessing the impact of IT governance misalignment on IT investment performance. The analysis of IT investment performance also requires financial data at the firm level, which restricts the scope of the research to public companies. Given the data needs, we acquired from Harte-Hanks data on all Fortune 1000 companies and their business units between 2001 and 2005. The data contains information on IT resources at both the business unit and the firm level. A unique aspect of the CI database is that it records three types of IT decisions at each business unit: PC purchasing decisions, server purchasing decisions, and network purchasing decisions. For each decision, the database indicates whether the decision is made by the headquarters (represented as "Parent") or by the business unit (represented as "Local"). The collection of the three purchasing decision variables captures not only a firm's use of a pure or federal IT governance mode at each business unit, but also the degree of centralization/decentralization in the governance mode.
One important limitation of using these variables for the IT governance alignment measure is that the data only contains variables on IT infrastructure governance. Prior IT governance studies suggest that the IT governance mode varies for different aspects of IT management (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; Tanriverdi 2006) . Therefore, the IT infrastructure governance mode does not represent a firm's overall IT governance mode. To address this limitation, we adopt the approach of measuring IT governance misalignment instead of measuring IT governance itself. The approach is based on the premise that, while firms may use different governance modes for different aspects of IT management, the ability of a firm to choose the right governance mode is usually consistent. A firm that demonstrates good ability in making the right choice for IT infrastructure governance is also likely to make the right choices for other aspects of IT governance. Therefore, the alignment measure of a firm's IT infrastructure governance is a proxy for the firm's overall IT governance alignment. In addition, we note that good IT infrastructure governance is the foundation for overall good IT governance. As Weill and Ross (2004) note, IT infrastructure constitutes over 50% of a firm's IT investment. Also, due to the compatiability constraints of information technology, IT infrastructure has a significant influence on application adoption and use management. Many applications do not work across different infrastructure platforms and project development and use management could be hampered by developers and users who are used to different infrastructure environments. Misalignment of IT infrastructure governance, therefore, has a very significant bearing on the misalignment of overall IT governance.
Second, to identity the diversification mode of a multiunit firm, we use the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database. The SDC Platinum M&A database records all publicly announced M&A transactions. Each record contains information about the two sides of the transaction, their primary SIC codes, balance sheet information, and details on the M&A deal including the value, effective date, and the percentage acquired from the target firm. We measure the diversification mode of a multiunit firm based on its five-year history of M&A transactions. We use the ratio of average M&A value over revenue to indicate the degree to which a firm's diversification mode is driven by M&A transactions. A higher ratio suggests the firm is mainly growing through acquisitions, while a lower ratio suggests that the firm is largely growing through internal development.
Third, to identify the corporate governance mode adopted by a multiunit firm, we use the Corporate Affiliations database from Lexis-Nexis. The database documents detailed subsidiary relationships within a firm. In particular, it records whether a subsidiary reports directly to the headquarters or to any other subsidiary. The subsidiary relationships reflect the degree of centralization regarding the general corporate governance mode adopted by a firm. A firm with most of its subsidiaries reporting directly to the headquarters indicates a powerful headquarters with more centralized governance. On the other hand, if a firm's subsidiaries have more authority in governing other subsidiaries, the firm has a corporate structure with more decentralized governance.
Finally, to analyze the impact of IT governance on IT investment performance, we obtain financial and performance data from the Compustat Industrial Annual database. These data include Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin's q, Sales, Employee, R&D investments, Market Share, Capital Investments and Debt-to-equity ratio.
Operationalization and Empirical Approach

Variables for Measuring IT Governance Alignment
Dependent Variable
We use IT Purchasing Decision to measure the IT governance mode at the business unit level. As mentioned earlier, the CI database records three types of IT purchasing decisions: PC purchasing decisions, server purchasing decisions, and network purchasing decisions. For each decision, the CI database indicates whether it is made by the headquarters or by the business unit. We aggregate the three decision variables to represent a business unit's IT governance mode. Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) point out that most firms have switched from a pure centralized or pure decentralized IT governance mode to a federal IT governance mode where headquarters and business units assume authority for different types of IT decisions. Therefore, it is important to look within the federal governance mode. We encode the IT purchasing decision into a binary variable (denoted as ITDec) that indicates whether a business unit adopts a more centralized or a more decentralized mode of IT governance. If at least two types of the IT purchasing decisions are made by a business unit, we set ITDec=1, which means that the business unit adopts a more decentralized IT governance mode. If at least two types of IT purchasing decisions are made by the headquarters, we set ITDec=0, which means that the business unit adopts a more centralized IT governance mode 2 .
Independent Variables
Business Unit Size: The size of the business unit (denoted as Size) is measured by the natural logarithm value of total employees in the business unit, as reported in the Harte-Hanks database.
Diversification Breadth: To assess diversification breadth, we compare the industry a business unit resides in to the industry of its headquarters. Variable DivBreadth identifies the distance between the two using a measure similar to Palepu (1985) on product market difference. If a business unit and its headquarters are in the same 4-digit NAICS industry, then DivBreadth=0. If a business unit and its headquarters are in the same 2-digit NAICS industry group but not the same 4-digit NAICS industry, then DivBreadth=1. If a business unit and its headquarters are in different 2-digit NAICS industry group, then DivBreadth=2. High DivBreadth means that the business unit focuses on product markets different from the headquarters.
Diversification Mode: The measure of diversification mode (denoted as DivMode) is derived using data from the SDC Platinum and Compustat databases. We use the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database to calculate the average value of mergers and acquisitions for each firm over the past five years. The ratio of average M&A value to the firm's operating income (obtained from Compustat) is taken as a measure of the firm's development through M&A. If this measure is small, it means that the firm mainly grows through internal expansion. If this measure is large, it means that the firm enters new markets mainly through mergers and acquisitions (Busija et al., 1997) .
Corporate Governance Mode: To assess the degree of centralization associated with a multiunit firm, we derive a measure of the Corporate Governance Mode (denoted as CorGov) using the subsidiary relationships reported in the CorporateAffiliations database from Lexis-Nexis. For each firm, we first calculate the total number of subsidiaries that reports directly to the headquarters. We then divide this number by the total number of subsidiaries of a firm reported in the database and take the consequent ratio as a measure of centralization of the multiunit firm. If this measure is larger, it means that a firm's headquarters has more control over its subdivisions (Collis et al. 2007 ). In this case, the corporate governance is more centralized. If this measure is lower, it means that the subsidiaries of the firm have more authority and the corporate structure is more decentralized.
Local IT Knowledge: The business unit's IT knowledge (denoted as ITKnow) is measured by the ratio of IT employees to the total employees of the unit. A low ratio indicates that the business unit has less IT-related knowledge. A high ratio of IT employees indicates that the business unit not only contributes more knowledge in investing and managing IT assets, but also provides more IT-related support for business processes.
Industry IT Effect: Industry effect has been shown to significantly influence firms' strategies (Mauri and Michaels 1998) . It is, therefore, necessary to control for heterogeneity in the industry environment that is not observable to researchers. We use 2-digit NAICS dummy variables to control for the industry effect.
Empirical Model for IT Governance
We employ a logistic regression model to identify the ideal IT governance mode for each business unit.
(1) 2 The traditional approach would encode IT purchasing decision as a three-level variable for pure centralized, federal or pure decentralized governance mode. This encoding scheme focuses on variations across the three types of governance modes. However, our data shows that more than 90 percent of all business units adopt some form of federal IT governance. The traditional encoding scheme, therefore, would capture little variations in IT governance modes. This potentially explains the insignificant results found in earlier studies that use such a three-level variable measure of IT governance to assess the influence of IT governance on firm performance (e.g. Tanriverdi 2006) . The two-level approach adopted in this study looks inside the federal governance mode and identifies whether they are more centralized or more decentralized. This new approach allows us to capture a significant amount of variation in IT governance modes and obtain a better fit for the regression model.
In the above logistic regression model, a positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the corresponding independent variable increases (decreases) the chance of adopting a more decentralized IT governance mode. Given the findings of prior studies, we expect that four of the contingency factors -business unit size (α 1 ), diversification breadth (α 2 ), diversification mode (α 3 ), local IT knowledge (α 5 ) -to be positively associated with decentralized IT governance, and the remaining factor -corporate governance mode (α 4 ), -to be negatively associated with decentralized IT governance. The regression model also includes industry fixed effect and time fixed effect as control variables.
We apply the regression model to the IT governance decisions at the business unit level and use the results to predict the ideal IT governance mode for a given combination of contingency factors for a business unit. The predicted IT governance mode could be different from the actual IT governance mode adopted by the business unit. We measure the deviation using the absolute value of standardized Pearson residual. The Pearson residual identifies the difference between the predicted and the observed IT governance mode and makes adjustments for variations in standard deviations of the difference 3 . The absolute residual provides a measure of IT governance misalignment for each business unit.
Since the objective of this study is to link IT governance misalignment with firms' IT investment performance, we aggregate IT governance misalignment measures to the firm level. We use the revenue-weighted average of IT governance misalignment for the aggregation.
Variables for Measuring Influence of IT Governance
Dependent Variable
We consider two measures of firm performance: Return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's q. Return on assets identifies a firm's ability to generate profits from its assets. This measure has been widely used in prior studies (e.g., Hitt and Bryjolfsson 1996; Tanriverdi 2006; Kohli and Devaraj 2003) . One drawback of the ROA measure is its narrow focus on firm profitability in the current fiscal year (Tanriverdi 2006) . The value of IT governance, however, could take years to materialize. To capture the long-term influence of IT governance, we also use Tobin's q as a measure of firm performance. Tobin's q is a forward-looking measure that reflects market expectations of future firm performance (Bharadwaj 2000; Berk et al. 1998) .
Independent Variable
IT Governance Misalignment: The key independent variable in our analysis of firm performance is the IT governance misalignment measure derived from the IT governance model in the previous section.
IT Capital: We measure IT capital using data from the CI database. The database provides detailed information about the IT infrastructure for each firm. We estimate a firm's IT capital using industry estimates of average IT assets prices and labor costs. The price of PCs is obtained from Zdnet (2005) and the price of servers is assumed to be five times that of PCs (Edwards and Tiley 2004) . We measure PC and server capital by multiplying number of PCs and servers with the respective prices, deflated by the BEA's price index for the category "Computers and Peripheral Equipment" of the Fixed Private Nonresidential Investment (Lee and Barua 1999) . IT labor cost is measured by multiplying the number of a firm's IT employees with industry-average labor compensation, deflated by the Index of Total Compensation Cost. Following Hitt and Bryjolfsson (1995) , the total IT capital is calculated as the sum of PCs and servers capital plus three times the IT labor cost. To overcome potentially missing softwarerelated expenditure in this measure (Hitt and Bryjolfsson 1996) , we also consider an alternative measure based on the total-ownership-cost (TOC) of networked LAN PCs. Industry research report that the total-ownership-cost (TOC) of IT each year can be estimated at $11,900 per networked LAN node (Cappuccio et. al. 1996) . This measure of TOC includes hardware, software, and other related expenditures. We use the deflated value of this TOC measure for an alternative estimate of the total IT capital. We then take the average of these two IT capital measures as our measure of IT capital. To standardize the measure of IT capital across firms, we divide IT capital by total assets of a firm.
Control Variables
3 The variations in standard deviation arise due to the discrete nature of IT governance mode. If a business unit is predicted to be x% centralized, it has x% probability to adopt a centralized governance mode and 1-x% probability to adopt a decentralized governance mode. The standard deviation is therefore x%) -x%(1 , which varies with x.
Industry Performance: Existing literature suggests that industry characteristics influence firm performance (McGahan and Porter 1999; Bharadwaj et al. 1999 ). Thus, we use the average ROA, and the average Tobin's q of the firm's primary industry (at the 4-digit NAICS code level), respectively, to control for industry effect.
Past performance: A firm's past performance captures managerial capabilities unobserved to researchers but has been shown to have significant influence on firm performance (Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Tanriverdi 2006) . We use the average ROA value of a firm over the previous five years as a control for past ROA-based performance, and the average Tobin's q of a firm over the previous five years as a control for past Tobin's q-based performance.
Firm size:
Size not only influences a firm's choice of IT governance mode, but also affects its financial performance. Economies of scale provide significant advantages to large firms in the form of lower costs. Firm size also affects internal coordination costs in a multiunit firm, as coordination costs increase exponentially with firm size. We measure firm size using two variables: logarithm of total number of employees and logarithm of total sales.
Other control variables:
We also follow the existing literature (Hitt and Bryjolfsson 1996; Bharadwaj et al. 1999 , Capon et. al. 1990 ) to incorporate an extensive set of control variables that may affect a firm's performance. These variables include R&D expenditure, diversification, market share, capital investment, and debt-to-equity ratio.
4 Table 2 presents a list of variables for the firm performance model, the data sources, and the descriptive statistics.
Empirical Model for IT Governance on Firm Performance
We expect IT governance misalignment to have a negative moderating effect on the influence of IT capital on firm performance. The higher the misalignment between the IT governance mode and the internal and external environment of a firm, the less the business value that the firm can generate from its IT assets. We use the following regression model to investigate how IT governance impacts IT business value.
(2) Table 3 shows the estimation results of the IT governance model. The coefficients of all the five factors in the model (i.e., Size, DivBreadth, DivMode, CorpGov, ITKnow) are significant. The signs of all the coefficients are also consistent with the hypotheses. Specially, the coefficient on Size is positive and significant, indicating that a larger business unit is more likely to adopt a decentralized IT governance mode. We also observe a positive and significant influence of DivBreadth, confirming that a decentralized IT governance mode is more likely to be adopted by a business unit if it resides outside of the primary industry of the headquarters. Similarly, the coefficient of DivMode is positive and significant (p<0.01). This result suggests that a firm that grows through mergers and acquisitions is more likely to adopt decentralized IT governance. We also note that the coefficient of CorpGov is negative and significant (p<0.01), suggesting that a firm with more centralized corporate governance structure (i.e., more business units report directly to the headquarters) is less likely to adopt decentralized IT governance. The coefficient of
Results
Choice of IT Governance
ITKnow is positive and significant as well, indicating that a business unit with more local IT knowledge is more likely to adopt a decentralized IT governance mode.
Overall, our results provide strong support for the multiple contingency factor approach on IT governance. We find that all five organizational contingency factors play a significant role in a firm's IT governance choice. The study reveals that it is the collective influence of the contingency factors that determines the optimal IT governance mode.
Ignoring any of the factors may result in a mis-specified IT governance mode.
IT Governance and Firm Performance
The results from Table 3 specify a model for predicting the ideal IT governance mode, given a set of contingency factors faced by a business unit. We use the prediction to measure IT governance misalignment for each business unit by comparing it against the observed IT governance mode adopted by the business unit. We use the absolute value of standardized Pearson residuals for the measure. The use of absolute value ensures that the misalignment measure is always positive as deviation from the predicted IT governance mode on either direction reflects misalignment. A low value of the measure means that a business unit adopts an IT governance mode that is closer to what is prescribed by the regression model. The value of the measure increases when a business unit deviates from the prediction. We aggregate the IT governance misalignment measure to the firm level by using a revenueweighted average across all the business units of a firm. Table 4 presents the results of the IT investment performance model. We start with the base model without accounting for the influence of IT governance (Columns 1 and 3). The results show that IT capital has a significant impact on a firm's ROA and Tobin's q. These results indicate that, on average, IT capital has both a substantial short-term and a substantial long-term influence on firm performance. These results are consistent with recent studies on the business value of IT investment (e.g. Mithas et al. 2008 ). The analysis also shows that industry environment, past performance, and other financial decisions such as sales, R&D expenditure, diversification, market share, capital investment and debt-to-equity ratio also significantly influence firm performance.
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 4 present the results of the full model, which includes the measure for IT governance misalignment and its interaction with IT capital. The results reveal how IT governance influences firm performance and, in particular, IT investment performance. We find that IT governance does not have a direct influence on firm performance. Instead, it influences firm performance by moderating the performance effect of IT capital (H1). The negative coefficient on the interaction between IT capital and IT governance misalignment suggests that firms with poor IT governance (i.e., high IT governance misalignment) obtain much less contribution from their IT capital than average firms. To identify the magnitude of the influence of IT governance on IT investment performance, Table 5 calculates IT investment performance for firms with average IT governance misalignment, firms with IT governance misalignment one standard deviation below the average (these are the firms with better than average IT governance), and firms with IT governance misalignment one standard deviation above the average (these are the firms with worse than average IT governance), respectively. 5 The coefficients in the table represent the impact of IT capital on the two firm performance measures (ROA and Tobin's q). The coefficients are linear functions of the coefficient on IT capital and the coefficient on the interaction between IT capital and IT governance misalignment 6 . Their standard deviations are derived from the covariance matrix of the regression estimation. The calculations show that when the firm's IT governance misalignment is one standard deviation above the average, IT investments have a negligible or even a negative impact on firm performance. More importantly, when the IT governance misalignment is one standard deviation below the average, the influence of IT investments is about two to three times the influence of IT investments for firms with average IT governance misalignment. These results provide evidence that IT governance plays a significant role in influencing the returns from IT capital investments. Firms with good IT governance obtain significantly more value from their IT capital, while firms with poor IT governance obtain no value. The results also reveal that a number of other factors, particularly capital investments, market share and 5 The mean and standard deviation of IT governance misalignment are 0.854 and 0.532 respectively. 6 The results in Table 4 indicate that the impact of IT capital on ROA with a given level of IT governance misalignment g is:
. Since all the variables in the regression are centered, the impact of IT capital on firms with average IT governance misalignment is just 0.166. The impact of IT capital on firms with IT governance misalignment one standard deviation below the average is 0.420 (=0.166+0.478×0.531), while the impact of IT capital on firms with IT governance misalignment one standard deviation above the average is -0.088 (=0.166-0.478×0.531). The calculation for the impact of IT capital on Tobin's q is derived with the same approach.
R&D, influence firm performance. Without controlling for these factors, the relationship between IT governance and IT investment performance could be mis-measured.
Discussion and Conclusion
Choosing the right IT governance mode is an important and challenging task. The objective of this paper is to provide a quantitative framework to measure the business value of IT governance. The result shows that making the right choice on IT governance plays an important role in realizing the business value of IT investments. Our study also validates the importance of considering multiple contingency factors in making IT governance decisions. The results provide evidence to support the contingency factors identified in prior studies.
The analysis furthers our understanding about the business value of IT. Studies conducted in the past decade have revealed that information systems are enablers. They complement other business process innovations in creating value, but do not generate much value on their own. Subsequent studies, therefore, focus on identifying complementary business processes and organizational changes. However, the identification of complementary business processes and organizational changes does not fully address what causes variations in IT investment performance. Businesses are expected to foresee and implement complementary business processes along with their IT investments. Therefore, understanding variations in IT investment performance requires us to look deeper into the IT investment decision process. We propose that an important cause of variations lies in IT governance, i.e., the allocation of IT decision rights in a firm.
Our quantitative approach generates important managerial implications. The regression model quantifies the tradeoff between multiple contingency factors and helps firms identify suitable governance modes for their business units in different environments. More importantly, the performance analysis provides clear evidence of the value and importance of making the right IT governance decisions. It reveals that firms with good IT governance can realize two to three times the value from their IT investments compared to an average firm. More importantly, firms with poor IT governance obtain little return from their IT investments. These results allow firms to quantify the value of IT governance and make the necessary changes to adopt appropriate IT governance modes for their business units.
Our analysis also has a number of limitations. First, our observation on IT governance is limited to IT infrastructure governance. The analysis is build upon the premise that IT infrastructure governance plays a critical role in overall IT governance and that firms that are good at making the right decision for IT infrastructure governance are likely to be good at making the right choices for other aspects of IT governance as well. Future research is needed to confirm this premise. Second, while we show that firms differ in IT governance alignment, our analysis does not address the causes of such variations. It could be related to senior management's IT knowledge, a firm's corporate governance or other organizational factors. It will be a worthwhile endeavor to identify what causes firms to deviate from the ideal governance mode. Third, our analysis focuses on the vertical distribution of IT decision rights between headquarters and business units. Recent studies suggest that horizontal distribution of IT decision rights between business functions and IT functions also plays an important role in IT investment decisions (Aral and Weill 2007) . It would be valuable for future research to study the horizontal distribution of IT decision rights and to examine its influence on the performance impact of IT investment. Finally, IT governance is just one of the elements in a firm's IT architecture (Sambamurthy and Zmud 2000; Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002) . Our analysis provides a glimpse into the value and importance of this element while leaving out the important task of assessing other elements and their interdependence to future research. We hope that this study will motivate future empirical research on organizational IT architecture and their impact on the business value of IT. 
